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ABSTRACT: Many today agree that philosophy, as an academic discipline, must, for the 
sake of its very survival, become more inclusive of a wider range of perspectives, coming 
from a more diverse pool of philosophers. Yet there has been little serious reflection on how 
our very idea of what philosophy is might be preventing this change from taking place. In this 
essay I would like to consider the ways in which our ideas about philosophy's relation to 
tradition, and its relation to other dimensions of human culture, influence efforts to promote 
greater diversity in the field.  
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1. 
 
Sometimes it is said that “the past is a foreign country”, and indeed it may be that 
here we have the first and most formidable expression of philosophy’s exclusionary 
character, of its xenophobia, if you will. This is a chronological xenophobia, also 
sometimes called ‘presentism’, which imagines the inhabitants of the past much in the 
way that ethnocentrists, as for example Eurocentrists, imagine the people in other 
parts of the world: as children, as a developmental stage on the way to the final 
version of humanity, which is represented by ourselves. Of course there is no political 
urgency to deal with this form of exclusion. The country of the past has a current 
population of zero; its inhabitants are all dead, and it is of no concern to them whether 
we regard them as equals or not. But this exclusion may still be helping to maintain, 
in unseen ways, other forms of exclusion that do very much affect the living.  
 For one thing, while the people of the past are themselves dead, recognition of 
their accomplishments, of their contributions to traditions, can give force or authority 
to the speech of the living today. Yet the presentist tendency in Anglo-American 
philosophy has made it difficult or impossible to affirm the significance of traditions. 
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What this means in actual practice is that there is only one recognized tradition, the 
Anglo-American one, but it does not conceive itself, for the most part, as a tradition. 
Rather, it is supposed to be a neutral and universal method for the apprehension of 
truth. This means that if you have been brought up to think philosophically, in a maṭh 
a madrasa, in a lineage of masters and of textual authorities that extends back a 
thousand years, the claims you make from your position embedded within this lineage 
can have no particular force, from the point of view of the Anglo-American 
philosophical presentist, as philosophical claims. On the terms on which the academic 
discipline is currently defined, there can be no dialogue of equals across traditions, 
since the perception reigns that it is only the other member of the attempted dialogue 
who belongs to a tradition at all, and that this is intrinsically an inferior form of 
engagement with ideas.  
  It is true, of course, that today there are few explicit presentists in the Anglo-
American philosophical tradition. Most do not openly agree with Gilbert Harman’s 
legendary injunction, as the sign on his Princeton office door said, “Just say no to the 
history of philosophy!” In the 1980s Harman himself explained that he took his views 
to be “mostly orthodox”. These views were never meant to denigrate the study of the 
history of philosophy in general, but only to dispute the supposed need for students of 
philosophy to study it. Harman is reported to have regretted upsetting people by 
distinguishing between philosophy and the history of philosophy, but to have averred 
that he did not fully comprehend the reasons for the upset (Sorell and Rogers 2005, 
43-44). 
 Harman had the lucidity to denounce what he called, following Walter Kaufmann, 
‘exegetical thinking’, in which one’s own views are read into a “sacred” text, “so that 
one can read them back out endowed with authority" (Sorell and Rogers 2005, 43-44). 
Harman rightly found this form of engagement with the past suspicious, and so 
preferred to conceive the project of philosophy as one that can do without the past 
altogether.  
  Interestingly, Harman cites Margaret Dauler Wilson, his “late friend”, as a 
historian of philosophy who is engaged in an intellectual project that is venerable, but 
still different from his own (Sorell and Rogers 2005, 43-44). Wilson wrote in 1992 of 
the tremendous upsurge of interest in the history of philosophy within American 
philosophy departments, and of the accompanying improvement of scholarly 
standards, notably in the mastery of the necessary languages and of the relevant 
philological skills. For her it was important to establish that the history of philosophy 
could be proven to be part of the same broad endeavor from which Harman had 
sought to separate it. In the end, the crucial question for Wilson is to determine, as 
she puts it, “how much reason [there is] to think that all this activity is likely to bear 
philosophical fruit” (Wilson 1992, 193). Simply coming to know that Descartes made 
this or that philosophical argument, in this or that text, in response to this or that set 
of problems, is not itself doing philosophy. For Wilson, the historian of philosophy 
begins doing philosophy when he or she takes Descartes’s arguments and shows how 
they can be put to use for the resolution of problems of current concern. 
  Arguably, such an approach could be thought of as “exegetical thinking” in 
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Harman’s sense: attempting to endow one’s own philosophical project with the 
authority of a respected elder: hence Harman’s denial of tradition, of the idea that 
philosophy has elders at all. Wilson would certainly not see her engagement with 
Descartes in this way. For her, Descartes is worth going to not because he is a 
respected elder, but because he is a source, potentially, of true arguments, for the 
resolution of current problems.  
 One might suppose that the expectation of philosophical fruit, as expressed by 
Wilson and like-minded historians of philosophy, emerged in part as a result of 
pressure from the much more powerful forces of Harman and like-minded non-
historian philosophers. That is, in order to prove our worth, and Descartes’ worth, the 
historians of philosophers imagined, we needed to prove that Descartes had 
something to say about problems a philosopher such as Harman would be prepared to 
recognize as philosophical. This is not to deny that Wilson sincerely had positive 
philosophical aims and interests of her own, but only to explain how it may have 
come about that an understanding such as Wilson’s of the relationship of the history 
of philosophy to philosophy came to dominate in American philosophy: an 
understanding on which philology, linguistic training, the study of the diversity of 
human cultures and of styles of expression, is only ever a means to an end, rather than 
an end in itself, only ever part of the tool-kit, rather than something constitutive of the 
very nature of the undertaking. We are not identifying with a cultural tradition, but 
only mining for resources.  
  One may also ask why, if it is true or useful arguments we are after, rather than 
inscribing ourselves in a tradition, we should focus to such a remarkable degree on 
the intellectual output of a small number of prominent figures from the European past 
who for their part did see themselves as working within a tradition (to varying 
degrees of course: after all, Descartes, just like Harman after him, went to great 
lengths to conceal his intellectual debt to his predecessors). Why go truth-mining only 
within a predetermined and extremely narrow philosophical canon? What if the 
greater reserves of truth are not to be found in the narrow shafts of the few known 
mines, but rather in the great beds of the world’s literary, religious, scientific, and 
legal traditions? What if the proper equipment to extract it is not only the pick-axe 
and the assayer’s glass (the equipment of the close reader of few texts), but also the 
telescope, the world map, the aerial survey? 
 
2. 
 
There are two related reasons for the limitation of the history of philosophy to known 
mines, of relatively easy access. The first is that, typically, in looking at history for 
answers to current philosophical problems, we are necessarily limiting ourselves to 
known philosophical problems. We are looking to the past for new answers, not new 
questions. This means that willy-nilly, and however we may think about what we are 
doing, we are working within a tradition, namely, the historical lineage of the people 
who have engaged with a particular set of questions that we, in the present, see as 
more or less exhausting the list of questions that might be asked under the banner of 
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philosophy. If we were in fact only truth-mining, looking for past ideas that might 
bear philosophical fruit, rather than joining up with a particular tradition, then we 
would be equally interested in discovering true, or plausible, answers to questions we 
have not even asked, perhaps questions we had never even thought of asking. Thus, 
again, a figure like Harman, who by his own lights rejects tradition tout court, 
ironically ends up putting pressure on historians of philosophy such as Wilson to stay 
true to a tradition, in order to be able to come up with answers from that tradition that 
Harman would be prepared to recognize as true and valuable on tradition-independent 
grounds.  
 The questions we didn't even think of asking, not surprisingly, often stem from 
intellectual traditions in regions more or less geographically and culturally removed 
from Europe. There is a continuity of conversation in what has come to be thought of 
as “Western” philosophy. Even if Heraclitus wrote in a very different idiom, and 
thought about what he was doing in a very different way than, say, Descartes or 
Kripke later would, there is nonetheless a retroactive subsumption of Heraclitus and 
other citizens of the foreign past into the same tradition that would also later include 
the professors in academic philosophy departments in the Anglo-American world. 
Such retroactive measures cannot be taken freely, to include just anyone from the past 
in the same continuous conversation. They must, rather, have taken place already in 
the distant past. They must have a long and venerable legacy. In other words, the 
rules that govern which figures Wilson might go to in search of answers to 
philosophical problems are, precisely, the rules of tradition. 
 
3. 
 
For reasons that go well beyond the history of ideas, Anglo-American philosophy 
emerges out of a tradition that includes Greeks, but excludes Indians. Since the 19th 
century, there have been attempts, many of them initiated in Germany, to revise the 
ancient canon, and to provide a new interpretation of the history of philosophy that 
retroactively includes the work of at least the members of the six Orthodox schools of 
Indian philosophy, and certain of the Unorthodox schools, notably Buddhism. But for 
the most part the Western philosophical tradition, even among people who refuse to 
see it as a tradition (either for the Harmanian reason that philosophy ought have no 
constitutive dependence on its past at all, or for the Wilsonian reason that we are only 
looking for truth, and are simply happy to receive it from people of the past who were 
asking the same sort of questions), has been unwilling to permit such a radical 
retroactive transformation of its past.  
  What is the nature of this resistance? Here we come to the second of the two 
related reasons for the limitation of the history of philosophy to a few familiar mine 
shafts. The 19th century, again, saw considerable interest among some European 
philosophers in plumbing the depths of the Vedas, and in welcoming Indian thought 
as an expression of the sort of archaic “authenticity” that was also found in classical 
Greece but was, some thought, compromised or vitiated by Judeo-Christian and 
“Semitic” influence. But for all the enthusiasm of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and the 
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many philosophically inclined German Orientalists, there was a simultaneous surge in 
interest in defining the project of philosophy to explicitly exclude “Oriental” 
traditions. This was a move that had never seemed necessary until the real possibility 
arose, and concrete examples were given to show, that European philosophers might 
actually do philosophy as well or better by reading the Upanishads as by reading 
Aristotle or Kant.  
 G. W. F. Hegel, in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy of 1825-26, 
represents a very clear instance of this reaction, of this unprecedented 
Europeanization of philosophy. This reaction would prove triumphant by the end of 
the 19th century, and in important respects remains the implicit vision of philosophy 
held by Hegelians and anti-Hegelians alike today. Bertrand Russell, who had had his 
anti-Idealist break at the close of the fin-de-siècle, and who would spend the rest of 
his career intermittently disparaging the Hegelian legacy, nonetheless repeats, in his 
own History of Western Philosophy of 1945, the same basic prejudice Hegel himself 
had expressed in his Lectures more than a century earlier. According to this prejudice, 
Oriental philosophy does not belong in the main body of any proper survey of the 
history of philosophy. In his Lectures Hegel does treat the various Oriental 
traditions—in which he includes not only India and China, but also the ancient 
learning of Mesopotamia, Iran, Syria, Egypt—but only does so in the Introduction. 
Part One of the work, the real beginning, sets out from Greece.  
 On Hegel’s view, Oriental philosophy fails to qualify as philosophy in the true 
sense, insofar as it remains thoroughly intermixed with religion, mythology, ritual, 
and other forms of spiritual and cultural life. Philosophy comes into being in earnest 
when it becomes autonomous from the cultural life of its practitioners, and this in turn 
is possible only under historical conditions, such as those that first obtained in 
classical Greece, in which men experience themselves as free individuals. To the 
extent that philosophy becomes newly autonomous from spiritual life in ancient 
Greece, however, there is a corresponding decline in the philosophical profundity of 
Greek religion. Its gods are conceived simply as individuals, rather than as 
representatives of concepts, whereas, for example, the Zoroastrian gods are not really 
individuals at all, but rather only “representations”, and thus incitements to 
philosophize: 
 
Individuality, as long as there is a lack of freedom, is not firm, and where the general 
representations are also individually constructed, it is still only superficial form. This is 
the main reason why Oriental representations appear to us at once as philosophical 
thoughts. As we hear from the Greeks of an Ouranos, Kronos—time, but also already 
individualized—we find among the Persians Zurvan Akurana, but this is unbounded time. 
We find Ahura Mazda and Angra Mainyu as the general sages, as representations; they 
appear as general principles, which thus seem to have a kinship with philosophy, or 
appear themselves as philosophers (Hegel 1993, 366).1 
                                                
1“Die Individualität, weil die Freiheit mangelt, ist nicht fest, und wo die allgemeinen Vorstellungen 
auch individuell gebildet sind, ist es doch nur oberflächliche Form. Dies ist der Hauptgrund, weshalb 
die orientalischen Vorstellungen uns gleich als philosophische Gedanken erscheinen. Wie wir bei den 
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The Persians thus get whatever limited philosophy they can from religion, while the 
Greeks have a religion with no philosophy, and a philosophy that, unfettered from 
other domains of culture, offers depths without limit. But if philosophy must be 
autonomous from culture in order to be true philosophy, then the study of the culture-
embedded philosophy of the Orient must not fall within the purview of academic 
philosophers. It must rather fall within the various scholarly disciplines of what was 
once called Orientalism, Indology, Sinology, etc., and would later be redubbed --in 
the hope of breaking free from the political legacy of these older traditions—“South 
Asian Studies”, “East Asian Studies”, and so on.  
  And this is in fact what has occurred: Hegel’s argument triumphed. Philosophy is 
not supposed to be concerned with the sort of human ideation that comes inextricably 
embedded in cultural forms such as religion and ritual. But in the Orient, the old 
Hegelian prejudice has it, there is no such autonomous philosophy, but only more or 
less philosophical manifestations of culture. Therefore Indian thought is not studied 
by the philosopher, but by the Indologist. Or, to update this slightly (and only 
slightly): you'll find your Indian philosophy in courses offered by the South Asian 
Studies department, but not, for the most part, by the philosophy department. If there 
is an occasional course of this sort, it will likely be slotted under the generic 'Non-
Western Philosophy' label. It is the residual class: what is left over when the real 
work of philosophy has been taken care of. 
 
4. 
 
Harman and Hegel are in fact not so far apart: both take philosophy to be an 
autonomous discipline, unconnected to the study of culture. Wilson is not so far from 
them either: she recognizes that one has to engage with the efflorescences of culture –
not just “foreign” languages, but also, when necessary, literary forms such as the 
philosophical novel or poem—but only as a means to the end that she shares with 
Harman and Hegel alike: autonomous engagement with philosophical ideas. The 
great difference between the three of them lies in the different ways each engages 
with tradition: Harman rejects it as a quagmire of exegetical illusions; Wilson steps 
cautiously into it, while not seeing her work as exegetical at all, but only as looking 
for philosophical fruit in the European philosophical tradition’s past; Hegel embraces 
a single tradition, and fully, indeed he sees philosophy as itself constituted by the 
“unfolding” of this tradition, ontologized in his mind as the “absolute Idea”. This Idea, 
however, this ultimate ground of human existence, is and must remain, for Hegel, a 
discretely, pure-bloodedly Greco-European thing.  
  Anglo-American academic Philosophy would indeed have remained stuck with 
this unattractive selection of options, had its hidden Hegelian presuppositions not 
been seriously shaken over the past few decades by certain important social changes 
                                                                                                                                      
Griechen von einem Uranos, Kronos – der Zeit, aber auch schon individualisiert – hören, so finden wir 
bei den Persern Zerwana Akarana, aber es ist die unbegrenzte Zeit. Wir finden Ormuzd und Ahriman 
als ganz allgemeine Weisen, Vorstellungen; sie erscheinen als allgemeine Prinzipien, die so 
Verwandtschaft mit der Philosophie zu haben scheinen oder selbst als Philosophen erscheinen.” 
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that extend throughout all of academia and indeed throughout much of the broader 
society in North America and in parts of Europe. In particular, since the early 1990s, 
when Harman was promoting chronological ethnocentrism, and Wilson was 
cautiously stepping out of the strictest formation of this prejudice, ethnocentrism in 
the strict and literal sense has become significantly harder to maintain as a vision of 
the world. In the academic context, the majority of younger professors are now very 
attuned to the ethnic and gender composition of the academic crowds they move in, 
and almost everyone agrees that too many 'white men' can have a detrimental effect 
on the flourishing of philosophical inquiry. The presumption is that the demographic 
homogeneity leads directly to a philosophical homogeneity, that in order for there to 
be a maximum diversity of views, there must be a maximum diversity of subtypes of 
human being. Diversification of the curriculum, in turn, becomes instrumentalized as 
a way of attracting a greater diversity of people, who will in turn, it is expected, bring 
with them a greater diversity of points of view. 
  There surely is a connection between demographic and philosophical diversity, 
and diversifying the curriculum is surely one of the ways of changing the 
demography. There has been little reflection, however, on how the categories that are 
salient in current social reality correspond to the categories with which we may 
usefully divide up the history of various philosophical traditions. To consider an 
obvious example, there does not seem to have been, in 17th century Europe, a 
category, “women”, that included all biologically female human beings in its 
denotation and that involved, in its connotations, all or even many of the same ideas 
and values associated with that term in the early-21st-century educated West. There 
were queens and duchesses who wrote philosophical treatises and carried on 
correspondences with canonical male philosophers, but it is not at all clear that in 
doing so they thought of themselves as realizing a capacity that was shared, equally, 
with women fishmongers or peasants. To take another example: however we today 
racialize Asian people who enter into the demographic mix of American or European 
academia, it is fairly safe to say that no Indian philosopher in the classical period 
thought of himself as a “person of color”. If “color” enters into a traditional Sanskrit 
pandit's self-conception at all, it does so as varṇa—literally “color”, but also 
“caste”—and here the pandit's “color” places him squarely on top of the social 
hierarchy. It is true that beginning in the Mughal period, the Persian Islamicate elite 
introduced quasi-racial distinctions, in which darker skin reflected lower status, and 
that these Persian distinctions in turn played an important role in the French 
philosopher François Bernier's supposedly novel 1684 racial typology (the first of its 
kind in Europe, anyhow) (Rubiés 2013). But the fact remains that ‘woman’, ‘person 
of color’, and other salient terms in today’s academic and social landscape, are 
historically constituted terms, indeed constructed categories, and they do not help us 
in any significant way to understand what Elizabeth of Bohemia or Gaṅgeśa’s 
philosophical projects were all about, let alone what the social conditions were that 
made these projects make sense.  
  One thus fears that if Elizabeth or Gaṅgeśa are added to the curriculum simply in 
order to assure students, and potential future professors, that philosophy includes 
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“people like me”, there is something of a swindle taking place. One senses that 
scholars ought to be studying the conditions of this appearance of “likeness”, not 
presuming it at the outset. One fears, moreover, that this presumption amounts to a 
sort of variation on Harman's notion of “exegetical thinking”, except that now one 
reads one's very identity back into texts, rather than just one's own views, so that one 
can read that identity back out, as Harman says, endowed with authority. 
 
5. 
 
Elizabeth and Gaṅgeśa are prime candidates for canonization: they are innovative, 
original thinkers, and they left ample textual evidence of this. The latter fact, their 
literacy and their access to the means of textual dissemination of ideas, are a 
reflection of their elite status in society (Elizabeth is far more elite within her society 
than Gaṅgeśa within his).  
 These considerations do not much trouble the mainstream campaign within 
Anglo-American academic philosophy for diversification. This casual indifference is 
peculiar. In some ways we might see the recent surge of interest among analytic 
philosophers in the cluster of problems grouped under the label of ‘standpoint 
epistemology’—roughly, the idea that who you are in society determines the range of 
things you might believe or might be pragmatically able to say, and also determines 
the range of interpretations that other members of society will give to what you say—
as a rather delayed echo of some of the principal insights of postcolonial theory and 
its later descendant, Subaltern Studies, for the development of which Indian 
intellectuals have played a crucial role (Chatterjee 2000). Characteristically, analytic 
philosophy ignores its debt, is for the most part unaware of this heritage, and leaves 
important elements of it out.  
  Subaltern Studies in particular has been centrally concerned with finding ways to 
draw out the voice of those who are, under a given social or political order, voiceless, 
notably members of the Dalit classs in India, whose modes of communication 
typically do not involve texts or systematic arguments. The task of finding the voices 
of the subaltern has led the members of this movement to develop rather rigorous and 
complex philological methods for drawing out submerged points of view. These 
methods often yield something in the spirit of Carlo Ginzburg’s influential 
microhistorical study, The Cheese and the Worms, in which the voice, and the 
cosmological representations, of a 16th-century Italian peasant are recovered from a 
rare court transcript that preserved, in an official record of the Inquisition, a trace of 
the popular imagination, spoken in dialect (Ginzburg 1980 [1976]). James H. Sweet, 
to provide another example of this sort of approach from a different part of the world, 
has recently offered a rich reconstruction of the thought-world of a 16th-century 
Afro-Brazilian slave and herbalist, who was tried in a Portuguese court for deviltry 
(Sweet 2011). The slave, Domingos Alvares, defended himself on the grounds that he 
was interested only in herbs, not the devil, and in the course of this defense we learn a 
considerable amount about the naturalist knowledge, inscribed within a long African 
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intellectual tradition, of a non-textual thinker, indeed a natural philosopher, whom 
history would otherwise have forgotten. 
  By multiplying the examples in this way I am hoping to motivate the conclusion 
that adequate attention to the worlds of the traditionally voiceless will necessarily 
involve both scholarly approaches that go beyond those suitable for studying 
canonical or easily canonizable texts, and will necessarily involve a rejection of the 
Hegelian view that philosophy embedded in culture—for example in the botanical 
knowledge required to treat tropical diseases—is not really philosophy at all.  
  Interestingly, we find just such a rejection in many of the programmatic proposals 
for the advancement of non-European philosophy made by intellectuals in Asia, Latin 
America, and most of all Africa, beginning in the mid-20th-century period of 
decolonialization. Thus, for example, at the Second Congress of Negro Writers and 
Artists, held in Rome in 1959, the participants in the Commission on Philosophy 
declare “that the African philosopher must base his inquiries upon the fundamental 
certainty that the Western philosophic approach is not the only possible one; and 
therefore... that the African philosopher should learn from the traditions, tales, myths, 
and proverbs of his people, so as to draw from them the laws of a true African 
wisdom” (Asante and Abarry 1996, 231-32). 
  This is an approach to the study of philosophy that is in one sense diametrically 
opposed to Hegel’s. It says that philosophy embedded in culture is philosophy in the 
fullest sense. This is also an approach that would yield very rich studies of the 
conceptual world of many African cultures, as for instance in Alexis Kagame’s 1976 
study, La philosophie Bantu, which sets out from the Danish linguist Louis 
Hjelmslev's dictum that “there is no philosophy without linguistics”, and goes on to 
construct a systematic philosophy for Bantu-speaking peoples out of the semantics 
and etymologies of the various Bantu natural languages (Kagame 1976). Kagame 
does not claim that there is a specialized class of members of Bantu-speaking 
societies consciously engaged in an activity that may be called ‘philosophy’, but only 
that the natural languages of all members of Bantu societies contain, so to speak, a 
latent philosophy, to which everyone in these societies has immediate access simply 
in virtue of their mastery of the languages. In a somewhat similar vein, in an 
influential volume edited by the late Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, we learn a great deal 
about oral traditions and values, and also quite a bit about what may be called 'folk 
science'. For example, there is a section on Yoruba physics, which includes a 
discussion of a rain-predicting hygrometer constructed from saliva expectorated by a 
Yoruba farmer into his hand and held up to the wind (Eze 1998). 
  While denying Hegel's separation of philosophy from culture, in another sense 
these works reinforce it. They effectively agree with Hegel that there is a legitimate 
distinction to be made between the forms of thought of non-Europeans and those of 
Europeans: the latter have their philosophy expressed in a high-culture, institutionally 
sanctioned, systematic tradition, while the former have their philosophy diffused 
throughout all of culture and natural language. This creates a manifest double 
standard, to the extent that it fails to recognize, for example, that European farmers 
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too have comparable methods of rain prediction, but that in Europe these do not get to 
count as philosophy.  
  To the extent that philosophy is permitted to be culture-embedded outside of the 
Greco-European tradition, but expected to be culture-autonomous within that tradition, 
there can be no hope for a unified or cohesive conception of the project of philosophy. 
The serious study of the least systematized, the least institutionally affirmed, the least 
textually canonized traditions will continue to be neglected, and if they are considered 
philosophy by those who conceptualize the project of philosophy in institutional, 
canonical, and textual terms, they will be so only as a matter of courtesy. Africa will 
remain the most disadvantaged. Special cases will be made for India and China, as 
insititutionally complex, literate civilizations, but here too their inclusion will be a 
matter of approximation of a standard set by the conventions and institutions valued 
by Hegel and like-minded Westerners. 
 
6. 
 
What then is to be done? To begin, we must free ourselves of our remaining Hegelian 
prejudices. This is not as difficult as it might seem, for indeed there is a long pre-
Hegelian tradition in European philosophy, recognizing the culture-embedded 
philosophy of traditions that do not descend from ancient Greece as philosophy in the 
fullest sense. In the 1740s Johann Jakob Brucker wrote extensively on the philosophy 
of the Celts, the Scythians, etc., as though it was just obvious that they had such a 
thing (Brucker 1742-44). Joseph-François Lafitau wrote similarly on the philosophy 
of the Iroquois in the 1720s (Lafitau 1724). In fact the idea that the search for wisdom 
might go beyond textual traditions and someday include what can be called 'folk 
philosophy' was not just a curiosity suggested by scattered minor figures. Canonical 
figures such as G. W. Leibniz, too, seem to have been keen on the idea that the study 
of culture-embedded thought, of oral traditions and popular wisdom, might well be 
the ultimate frontier of a philologically grounded philosophy. Thus Leibniz writes in 
the New Essays concerning Human Understanding of 1704:  
 
When the Latins, Greeks, Hebrews and Arabs shall someday be exhausted, the Chinese, 
supplied also with ancient books, will enter the lists and furnish matter for the curiosity of 
our critics. Not to speak of some old books of the Persians, Armenians, Copts and 
Brahmins, which will be unearthed in time so as not to neglect any light antiquity may 
give on doctrines by tradition and on facts by history (Leibniz 1849-60, 5, 318). 
 
With these textual traditions mastered, Leibniz thinks that the real work will have just 
begun: “And if there were no longer an ancient book to examine, languages would 
take the place of books, and they are the most ancient monuments of mankind” 
(Leibniz 1849-60, 5, 318). Leibniz's injunction seems to echo in turn through the 
work of later German humanists such as J. G. Herder, who would in turn influence 
the anthropological projects of Franz Boas and Zora Neale Hurston, who in their own 
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ways sought to discern, so to speak, the unity in the multiplicity. Kagame's project, 
too, would amount to a sort of realization of Leibniz's prediction.  
  So the first major obstacle to greater inclusiveness, the casting off of the Hegelian 
prejudice, proves fairly easy: there are ample alternatives to such a limiting 
conception of philosophy even within the European intellectual tradition. A further 
obstacle, which must be overcome, in addition to the Hegelian elevation of a single 
tradition above all others, is the Harmanian rejection of tradition tout court. I hope to 
have established by now that we all work and think within traditions, and that the 
work of the philosophical scholar ought to include some interest in surveying the 
diversity of traditions. I hope to have established, also, that there is no good reason 
not to presume full equality of all traditions at the outset, regardless of differences in 
their mechanisms of transmissions (e.g., textual, oral), or of the degrees of 
systematization of their commitments from within the traditions themselves. If there 
is less systematization, as in the case of Bantu philosophy, this simply means that 
there may be additional work for the scholar to carry out in order to draw it out in a 
way that will enable outsiders to appreciate it. But the simple difficulty of accessing 
something can be no evidence for its non-existence, any more than damaged portions 
of papyri, rendering bits of text illegible, may justify the conclusion that the missing 
words must have been the unimportant ones. Challenges are not grounds for neglect, 
but on the contrary for redoubled effort.  
  There is, further, no contradiction between continuing to work within a tradition, 
and developing a scholarly interest in the diversity of traditions. This is a banal truth 
to scholars in the other human sciences. No Mesopotamianist believes that she must 
abandon her society's system of time measurement in order to study Babylonian 
calendars. But this does not prevent her from learning things from these calendars 
about the way humans grapple with and think about the passage of time. Only 
philosophers remain as if phobic about potential contamination from foreign belief 
systems.   
 Finally, it will be necessary to reject the ‘area studies’ approach to different 
philosophical traditions. This approach continues to reign, and to needlessly limit, the 
study of human history and culture in several university departments, creating 
artificial boundaries that reflect linguistic, or current geopolitical realities, but that 
neglect real relations of exchange and communication between regions. Thus for 
example there can be no good scholarly reason, as Karine Chemla has compellingly 
shown, to study the history of Chinese mathematics as, principally, a Chinese matter 
(Chemla 2012). There are so many transregional connections and ramifications in the 
spread of mathematical ideas and techniques that to confine the focus to a national or 
regional scale is to fail to adequately understand the subject in question. The same is 
certainly the case for European mathematics. Yet this is hard to see, in large part 
because here too there is a strong urge toward canonization. We want to attach names 
to innovations. Thus we have the “Leibniz series”, for dealing with the infinite 
expansions of trigonometric sine, cosine, and arctangent functions. We have recently 
agreed to start calling this the “Leibniz-Mādhava series”, in recognition of the Indian 
mathematician Mādhava of Sangamagrama, who seems to have worked it out roughly 
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three centuries before Leibniz. We may presume, in turn, that there are countless 
intermediaries whose names will never be known—Persians, Arabs, French and 
Italian Jesuits, who brought it about that forms of thinking might diffuse from South 
Asia to Europe so as to make Leibniz's “discovery” possible. The adequate study of 
this sort of mathematical discovery is the one that does not permit it to remain the 
property of one or two discoverers, or of any particular national or regional tradition. 
Its nature is best grasped by the approach that academic historians have come to call 
‘connected history’ (Subrahmanyam 2005a, Subrahmanyam 2005b). 
 
7. 
 
It is a reasonable hypothesis, one that I intend to let guide all of my own future work, 
and that I would like to encourage other historians of philosophy to adopt as well, that 
all of the history of philosophy might best be approached in this way: as global, 
connected history. There are traditions, pace Harman, and they are inescapable. But 
they are not, pace Hegel, discrete or autochthonous expressions of something special 
in one exceptional culture or in a limited number of cultures. They are, rather, local 
inflections of a universal human capacity. The capacity we call ‘philosophy’—the 
conceptual engagement with the nature of reality and of our place in reality—finds its 
inflection in all human cultures, and there are channels of transmission and exchange 
of philosophical ideas between cultures, even apparently 'static' cultures, to which we 
will never be able to attach the proper names of innovative thinkers.  
  In order to adequately appreciate these facts, and to study these philosophical 
inflections in an adequate way, we need to recognize that the study of philosophy is, 
among other things, the study of culture. Such a transformation, I maintain, is a 
necessary precondition of any future form of academic philosophy that will satisfy the 
current desideratum of greater inclusiveness. 
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